Recent Decisions by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 23 Issue 2 Article 5 
1954 
Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Decisions, 23 Fordham L. Rev. 204 (1954). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-RESIDENCE OF CORPORATION-SERVICE UPON DOMESTIC COR-
PORATION UNDER SECTION 52 OF NEW YoRiu VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAw.-Plaintiff
was injured by one of defendant's vehicles and attempted to institute suit by service
of process under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 52, which provides for service
upon non-residents who use New York highways. The reason for plaintiff's choice of
this method of service was a statement by defendant's local agent that the company's
principal offices were in Ceveland, Ohio, and a statement in the certificate of registra-
tion which gave the defendant's residence and principal place of business as Cleveland,
Ohio. Defendant was incorporated in New York. Defendant's motion to vacate
service upon the ground that defendant was a domestic corporation and hence not a
non-resident was denied at Special Term and affirmed by a divided court in the
Appellate Division. Upon appeal, held, three judges dissenting, reversed. Defendant
was not estopped from asserting it was a domestic corporation and not a non-
resident within Section 52. Sease v. Central Greyhound Lines Inc. of New York, 306
N.Y. 284, 117 N.E.2d 899 (1954).
The instant case brings into focus subtle distinctions existing between the concepts
of domicile and residence and their resultant effect upon attempts to serve corpora-
tions under Section 52 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.' The term
"resident" connotes a lesser degree of permanence than domicile in that it requires
only bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place.2 Domicile requires, in addition,
that there be an intention to make the given place one's home.3
It is a well settled rule that a corporation is domiciled in the state where it is
incorporated. 4 This is so even though its stockholders, agents and officers live
without the state5 or it transacts its business in another state where it is licensed
to do so.6 Other cases have adhered to the more conservative view that a corporation
has its exclusive residence and domicile within the sovereignty which created it.7
The basic rule has been applied in the construction of the federal jurisdiction clause
1. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 52 provides that the operation of a motor vehicle in
this state by a non-resident or the operation of a motor vehicle owned by a non-resident
with his consent, express or implied, shall amount to the appointment of the secretary of
state as the person upon whom process may be served in any action arising out of an
accident in which the non-resident was involved.
2. In re Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 239, 84 N.E. 950 (1908).
3. This definition is in accordance with decisions in the majority of jurisdictions in-
cluding New York. Restatement, Conflict of Laws Sec. 9 (1934); Holt v. Hendee, 248
Ill. 288, 93 N.E. 749 (1911); Gelman v. Gelman, 52 Me. 165, 83 Am. Dec. 502 (1863);
Kerby v. Town of Charlestown 78 N.H. 301, 99 AU. 835 (1916); Dupuy v. Wertz, 53 N.Y.
556 (1873).
4. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1891); National Leather Co. v. Common-
wealth, 256 Mass. 419, 152 N.E. 916 (1926); Douglas v. Phenix Ins. Co., 138 N.Y. 209,
33 N.E. 938 (1893) ; Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N.Y. 208 (1866).
5. McKendrick v. Western Zink Mining Co., 165 Col. 24, 130 Pac. 865 (1904); Stephens
et al. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 41 N.Y. 149 (1869).
6. In re Mathews Consolidated Slate Co., 144 Fed. 724 (D.C. N.Y. 1905).
7. Douglas v. Phenix Ins. Co., 138 N.Y. 209, 33 N.E. 938 (1893); Bridges v. Wade, 113
App. Div. 350, 99 N.Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dep't 1906).
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in diversity of citizenship cases,8 in determining residence within the meaning of
an attachment statute and in providing security for costs.10
However, this rule has not been without criticism.'1 A natural person, although
he may have but one domicile may have several residences;'- so also may these
attributes be imputed to corporations.13 The tendency of judicial decision has been
in the direction of placing corporations upon the same footing as natural persons in
regard to jurisdiction of suits by or against them.14 Accordingly, a corporation has
been adjudged for purposes of taxation a resident of a state where its principal
offices are found and its business centralized.15 Also the courts have distinguished
the domicile of a corporation from the principal residence where it carries on its
business activity and, in a very real and practical sense, has its existence.' 6
It is submitted that the concept of corporate residence should not be immutable,
that whether or not a corporation is resident in a particular state apart from its
domicile should be governed by the purposes of the legislative act in question.' 7
There exists support for the theory that the word "residence' as used in the New York
Civil Practice Act connotes domicile.' 8 However, earlier decisions under the Nevw
York Code of Civil Procedure distinguish the two concepts'" and the recent trend
seems to continue to recognize this distinction.2 0
The distinction between domicile and residence under Section 52 has been rec-
ognized in the case of Uslan v. Woronoff'-1 where a New York domiciliary was held
8. Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1904).
9. Central Western Development Co. v. Lewis, 142 Miss. 428, 107 So. 557 (1926).
10. Welling Co. v. Platt, 173 N.Y. Supp. 460 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
11. "To make the rights and liabilities for a corporation depend upon a fictitious domicile
ascribed by law to an intangible entity is to disregard the tangible physical dement entirely."
Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 190,
191 (1918) "The Corporation need have neither domicile nor nationality. Those who have
endeavored to fix it with one or the other have wandered in the wilderness of bleak un-
certainty.' Baty, The Rights of Ideas and of Corporations, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 371 (1920).
See also Francis, Domicile of a Corporation, 38 Yale L.J. 336 (1929).
12. In re Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 239, 84 N.E. 950 (1908).
13. Beschoff v. Schnepp, 139 Mlisc. 293, 249 N.Y. Supp. 49 (City Ct. 1930).
14. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898); Brand v. Auto Service Co.,
75 NJ.L. 330, 67 AtL 19 (1909).
15. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 313 (1939); Southern
Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1936); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298
U.S. 193 (1935).
16. Int'l Milling Co. v. Columbia Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934); Missouri ex rel. St. Louis
V. & Al. R. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924).
17. Kimmerle v. Topeka, 88 Kans. 370, 128 Pac. 367 (1912).
18. Klemock v. Nantex Mfg. Co., 201 App. Div. 236, 194 N.Y. Supp. 142 (2d Dep't
1922) ; De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N.Y. 485, 24 N.E. 996 (1890). However, note in the latter
case that the court admitted that the legislature in certain statutes did intend that residence
meant the actual habitat of the individual and not his domicile.
19. Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N.Y. 22 (1851); Frost v. Brisbin, 19 Wend. 11 (N.Y. 1837);
Pooler v. Maples, 1 Wend. 65 (N.Y. 1828).
20. Perkins v. Guaranty Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 250, 8 N.E.2d 849 (1937); Rawstorne
v. Maguire, 265 N.Y. 204, 192 N.E. 294 (1934); Stoddard v. Manzella, 207 App. Div. 519,
203 N.Y. Supp. 136 (3d Dep't 1924).
21. 173 Misc. 693, 18 N.Y.S.2d 222 (City Court 1940), affd, 259 App. Div. 1093, 21 N.Y.
Supp. 2d 613 (2d Dep't 1950).
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to be a non-resident on the strength of the fact that his principal residence for most
of the year was at a university in Pennsylvania. This actual residence test has also
been applied in other jurisdictions which have similar statutes.2 2 It would appear
that this is not only the better interpretation in the light of the purpose to be ac-
complished by the statute, 23 but perhaps the only interpretation consistent with the
U.S. Constitution.2
4
The court in the instant case has failed to make this distinction. After rejecting
any estoppel against the defendant, the court proceeds to test the applicability of
Section 52 by a domicile theory. The legislature by the enactment of Section 52 of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law intended to bring negligent non-resident motorists within
the jurisdiction of the court.25 If the intention was to restrict such service to non-
domiciliaries the words of the statute fail to make this clear. The apparent purpose
of the section is to facilitate the service of process upon the tort-feasor whose
principal residence is not within the state,26 still, however, safeguarding to him his
right to fair notice of the action pending against him.27
The court, however, in paying homage to the "domicile where incorporated" theory
has overlooked the practical result sought by the statute by holding the defendant
corporation to be a resident in spite of the fact that its principal offices and place of
business were in a foreign jurisdiction and that it was a New York corporation in
name only. By voiding the service of the complaint the court deprived the plaintiff
of her day in court since the statute of limitations has barred her claim; thus the
practical consequence of such reasoning becomes apparent. 28 Continued adherence
by the courts and legislature to legal fictions will result in consistency at the expense
of rights, and in correct form at the expense of substantial justice.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESs-STATUTE GIVING COURT JURISDICTION FOR
DIVORCE WITHOUT PROOF OF DomicE.7-Petitioner, a resident of Connecticut,
sought a divorce in the Virgin Islands after completing the required six weeks'
residence. A local statute provided that six weeks' residence was prima facie evidence
22. Mann v. Humphrey, 257 Ky. 647, 79 S.W.2d 17 (1935); Bigham v. Foor, 201 N.C.
14, 158 S.E. 548 (1931); United Services Auto Ass'n v. Harman, 151 S.W.2d 609, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941).
23. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 302 N.Y. 226, 235, 97 N.E.2d 877, 882 (1951).
24. Douglass v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929),
pointed out that the denial of the use of the state courts solely on the basis of domicile
rather than residence would he a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of tho
Constitution. Although the Douglass case is factually distinguishable from the instant case,
it might be argued that the refusal of the court here to recognize the distinction between
residence and domicile also violates the immunities clause of the Constitution in that it
grants an immunity to a domiciliary which it denies to a non-domiciliary. See also Chambers
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907). Murnon v. Wabash R.R. Co., 246
N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508 (1927).
25. Cooper v. Amhler, 178 Misc. 844, 35 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
26. Uslan v. Woronoff, 173 Misc. 693, 18 N.Y.S.2d 222 (City Court 1940), aff'd 759
App. Div. 1093, 21 N.Y.S.2d 613 (2d Dep't 1940).
27. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
28. This important consequence was noted in the Appellate Division report of tho
instant case. Sease v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. of New York, 281 App. Div. 192, 118
N.Y.S.2d 433 (3d Dep't 1952).
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of domicile and that when both parties are before the court no further reference to
domicile shall be had. Defendant husband appeared and waived service of summons.
When asked by the court to provide further proof of domicile other than the six
weeks' requirement, petitioner refused. The court then dismissed the petition. On
appeal before the full bench, three judges dissenting, held affirmed. The statute
was violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Alton v. Alton:,
207 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1953).
The problem presented to the court is a novel one. It is the first attempt by a
legislature' in the United States or its territories to make divorce transitory in
nature by easing the domiciliary requirements. There can be no doubt that the
statute2 was intended to have this effect.
The majority argued that the fact of six weeks' residence was not rationally
connected with domicile and, hence, did not fall within the rule of Mobile, J. &
K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed3 that, for the creation of a valid legislative presumption,
there must be a rational connection between the presumption and the fact to be
proved. On this point it is difficult to disagree with the majority opinion. In our
present day mode of living, a sojourn of six weeks in a particular place for reasons of
health, amusement, education, business, or divorce does not compel the conclusion
that the sojourner intends to become a domiciliary of that particular place. 4
The presumption, if valid, would be rebuttable. It merely shifts the burden of
going forward with the evidence. But if defendant appears before the court to rebut
the presumption, would not the second part of the statute take effect and deny
defendant the opportunity of contesting the jurisdiction? The majority argues that an
attempt by one state "to take to itself the readjustment of domestic relations between
those domiciled elsewhere" 5 is a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.8 The basic assumption in this reasoning is that adherence to the
domiciliary requirement is necessary if the states are to have control over the domestic
relations of their citizens. From this it follows that a state cannot confer an interest
on a court when it does not have the power to deal with the subject matter.,
1. Throughout the majority and dissenting opinions, the Virgin Islands Legislature is
treated as a state legislature with similar powers as regards the subject of divorce. (48
U.S.C.A. §§ 1405 et seq.)
2. VI. Laws 1953, No. 55, Divorce Law of VI., § 9: "... if the plaintiff is within the
district at the time of the filing of the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks
immediately prior thereto, this shall be prima fade evidence of domicile, and where the
defendant has been served personally within the district or enters a general appearance in
the action, then the court shall have jurisdiction of the action and of the parties thereto
without further reference to domicile or to the place where the marriage was solemnized
or the cause of action arose."
3. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
4. In Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952), the Court held that the words
"resident" and "residence" in the Virgin Islands divorce statute should be interpreted to
mean "domicliary" and "domicile."
5. 207 F.2d 667, 677.
6. See Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So.2d 236 (1948) where the court held
that a petition for divorce under a similar statute was correctly denied where neither
party was a resident of the state, although both appeared in the Alabama court. The
court said at p. 238 of 36 So.2d: "Here the statute seeks to act on a status which is
beyond the boundaries of a state. This it cannot do."
7. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 43. In Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, N.Y.L.J., March 18,
19541
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The dissent apparently bases its reasoning on the fact that the domiciliary rule
is not entitled to constitutional sanction. The Supreme Court has heretofore given
constitutional sanction to many of the rules of common law and, as was pointed out
in Williams et al. v. North Carolina,8 the domiciliary requirement is well entrenched
in the common law. The dissent also states that the concept of domicile as the
basis for divorce is elusive and unsatisfactory.9 But what else could be used as a
basis? If domicile is eliminated as the basis of jurisdiction for divorce, there might
well be endless confusion as to the circumstances which would entitle a divorce
decree to full faith and credit under the constitution.10
An intent to make a place one's home and the fact of physical presence are the
established requisites for domicile." Let it be assumed, arguendo, that the statute
is valid and in effect. What, then, would be its effect on the present law? If only
one party is before the court, there would be no change. For example, the decree
could still be opened in the state of true domicile to contest the jurisdiction if it is
found that the domicile of the plaintiff was in fact fraudulent. 12 At first blush, it
would seem that if both parties appeared before the court, the question of jurisdiction
would be res adjudicata. 13 The point is, however, that the matter of jurisdiction has
not been adjudicated, nor has it even been mentioned. Defendant has not been given
his day in court and thus has been denied due process. 14
Another problem also arises from this assumption. When a state which is the
domicile of neither party assumes jurisdiction, what law should the court apply? The
initial determination of Williams et al. v. North Carolina by the Supreme Court'r
concluded, in effect, that the problem of choice of law does not arise when one
party is domiciled within the forum. But if domicile is not necessary to give
jurisdiction, should the court apply the law of the forum or that of the true domicile?10
1954, p. 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.), Walter, J. declared that the instant case might have been
decided on this point alone. Cf. DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1900); Walsh v. A.
Waldron & Sons, 112 Conn. 579, 153 Atl. 298 (1931); Eaton et al. v. Eaton, 233 Mass.
351, 124 N.E. 37 (1919); Wolfe v. Lewisburg Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 305 Pa. 583, 158
Atl. 567 (1931).
8. 325 U.S. 226, 229-230 (1945).
9. Supra note 5, p. 682.
10. In Zieseniss v. Zieseniss (supra note 7), there is a full discussion of New York
C.P.A. § 1147 which permits an action for divorce "when the parties were married within
the state." The court, in holding the statute valid, suggests that ". . . if ...there could
be substituted, as the foundation of divorce jurisdiction, the ... unchanging fact of the
place of marriage, there would be no migratory divorce, and the perplexing confusion and
uncertainty which attend it would disappear."
11. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 9.5 and authorities cited.
12. Williams et al. v. North Carolina, supra note 8.
13. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948),
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
14. The basic requisites of due proceess when applied to judicial proceedings are that
parties bound have notice and opportunity to present every available defense. State of
Kansas ex rel. Beck et al. v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. et al., 95 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 603 (1938).
15. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
16. The cases of John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) and Home Ins.
Co. et al. v. Dick et al., 281 U.S. 397 (1930) indicate that the law of the state with
jurisdiction over the subject matter would control. In the instant case petitioner could not
[Vol. 23
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A further and more complicated problem would ensue if each spouse had a separate
domicile.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions seem to have overlooked a discussion
of a point of vital importance. Defendant can move to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.17 A motion
of this type does not constitute a general appearance. 18 Therefore, since defendant
has an opportunity to contest the jurisdiction of the court without submitting to a
general appearance, there would be no denial of due process, This would seem to
enable the defendant to rebut the prima fade presumption without causing the
second part of the statute to take effect. The Virgin Islands, if it wished to make
divorce transitory in nature must have intended that a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter would constitute a general appearance. 19
It is submitted that until the concept of intent is eliminated from our basic and
traditional idea of domicile, or until domicile itself is eliminated as the basis for
divorce jurisdiction, any attempt, such as that of the Virgin Islands, to circumvent
the rules laid down in Williams v. North Carolina and kindred cases, will be in-
validated and therefore ineffectual. If intent is eliminated, then a divorce action will
be transitory.20 But this can only be done if the Supreme Court feels that the states
should relinquish their control over'the domestic relations of their citizens. A change
of this nature would only create greater confusion.
INNKEEPER-GUEST RELATIONSHIP-STATUTORY LII"TATION Or LmBmnrry -Some-
time in 1944 the plaintiff left some luggage in defendant's hotel and departed. The
hotel agreed to store the plaintiff's luggage as an accommodation. The plaintiff returned
in 1946, but did not resume residence in the hotel because accommodations were not
available. The plaintiff stayed at another hotel, but continued to leave some of his
belongings in the defendant's storeroom on the advice of the defendant's manager
that he might do so. In November, 1947, the plaintiff again presented himself at the
defendant's hotel and discussed accommodations, but did not take up residence because
the rates were unsatisfactory. He then attempted to get his luggage, but it was
missing. The City Court held that the relationship of innkeeper and guest had ceased
and held that the defendant, acting as a bailee, was liable for the full value of
the property. The Appellate Term affirmed the decision of the City Court vthout
opinion. On appeal, held, judgment modified. The liability of the defendant inn-
have been able to secure a divorce as the Connecticut law does not include that cause of
action as grounds for divorce. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7327 (1949). It is certain that the
Virgin Islands statute was not intended to have this effect. It would tighten, rather than
ease, the requirements for a valid divorce.
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
18. Toulmin et al. v. James Mlfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 512 (W.D.N.Y. 1939); American-
Mexican Claims Bureau v. Morganthau et al., 26 F. Supp. 904 (D.C. 1939).
19. There is some support for this position. Hale v. Campbell et al., 40 F. Supp. 584
(D.C. Iowa 1941) rev. on other grounds, 127 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1941).
20. If one party who has performed the statutory requirement is before the court, then
the court would have jurisdiction of one spouse by the mere fact of physical presence and
the decree would not be open to attack (Williams et al. v. North Carolina, supra note 8).
When both parties are before the court, the jurisdiction would be res adjudicata, if the
plaintiff proves the fulfillment of the statutory requisite (supra note 13).
1954]
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keeper was limited by General Business Law Section 201. Dilkes v. Hotel Sheraton,
Inc., 288 App. Div. 488, 125 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1st Dep't 1953).
Section 201 of the New York General Business Law limits the liability of the
innkeeper for property delivered to the hotel by a guest for storage to $100 unless a
value in excess of $100 is stated by the guest and a receipt is issued for the excess in
which case the liability increases to $500 unless the loss is due to the negligence of
the hotel. The problem created by the instant case is whether the liability of the
innkeeper will remain limited by the provisions of the statute after the guest departs.
The court held that the relationship at the time of the delivery of the goods is
controlling.1 The court further held that neither the fact that the goods were
permitted to remain in the baggage room as a matter of accommodation with the expec-
tation or mere hope on the part of the hotel that the plaintiff would return and resume
his residence alters the relationship in which the goods were held nor removes the
limitation of liability. This seems superficially to be reasonable. During the time in
which the plaintiff was a guest the liability of the innkeeper was limited. To hold
that the liability of the innkeeper is greater after the economic benefit to the innkeeper
ceases does seem harsh.
However, the statute in question was designed to limit the liability of the innkeeper
at a time when he was under a duty to accept und retain the property of a guest.
It here appears, however, that in 1944 the plaintiff left some luggage at the hotel
and departed and that the hotel agreed to store his belongings as an accommodation. 2
The property was therefore accepted, or at least retained, at a time when there was
no duty on the defendant's part so to do. No compelling reason appears why the
innkeeper should receive any preference over other bailees when he voluntarily elects
to act as a bailee for a person no longer a guest and of property he is under no duty to
accept or retain.
The court bases its decision on a finding that the relationship of the defendant
with respect to the stored goods did not change. This would appear to lead to the
conclusion that the hotel remained an insurer. But for the role of an insurer there
must exist the relationship of innkeeper and guest.3 Despite the fact that the court
constantly refers to the plaintiff as a guest it seems clear that plaintiff was not a
guest after he paid his bill and departed from the hotel. The determination whether
plaintiff was a guest or a bailor is undoubtedly a question of fact.4 Leading cases in
other jurisdictions on factual situations similar to the present case have held that the
relationship of bailee and bailor existed rather than that of innkeeper and guest.5
In Miles v. International Hotel Co.6 the plaintiff came to defendant's hotel with
luggage and registered as a guest. The plaintiff after paying her bill left the luggage
1. Dilkes v. Hotel Sheraton, Inc., 288 App. Div. 488, 125 N.Y.S.2d 38, (1st Dep't
1953). "The time of delivery would seem the operative date."
2. 288 App. Div. 488, 125 N.Y.S.2d 38, (1st Dep't 1953).
3. Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N.Y. 577 (1865). Where one leaves goods with an innkeeper
not as a guest the property is subject to no lien and is protected by no insurance. Ticehurst
v. Bienbrink, 72 Misc. 365, 129 N.Y.Supp. 838, 845 (App. Term 1911); Story, Com-
mentaries on The Law of Bailments (9th Ed. 1878).
4. Slater v. Landes, 172 N.Y. Supp. 190 (App. Term 1918); Story, Commentaries on
The Law of Bailments 449 (9th Ed. 1878).
5. McKeever v. Kramer, 203 Mo. App. 269, 218 S.W. 403 (1920); Miles v. International
Hotel Co., 289 Ill. 320, 124 N.E. 599 (1919); Hotels Statler Inc. v. Safier, 103 Ohio 638,
134 N.E. 460 (1921).
6. 289 Ill. 320, 124 N.E. 599 (1919).
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with the defendant hotel for "gratuitous storage" and departed. The court held the
guest-innkeeper relationship ceased when plaintiff paid her bill and departed and
defendant was liable merely as a bailee for the loss of the luggage. In Hotels Statler
v. Saier7 the plaintiff for a few days in each of several consecutive weeks became a
guest of defendant's hotel. He checked out each week with the expectation of return-
ing at the end of the week as a guest. Each week the plaintiff returned to the hotel,
staying as a guest for three or four days. By arrangement with the defendant hotel
each time the plaintiff left the hotel he left his trunk for storage until his weekly
return. The payment of the hotel bill and the engagement for storage of the trunk
were simultaneously made. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed a finding of fact of
the trial court that, "While technically a guest when the arrangement for storage was
made, the transaction for the storage of goods covered a period when no such relation-
ship existed, although such future relation was contemplated with advantage to both
parties." s The court held that if any liability accrued it arose from a bailment for
the accommodation of both entered into when the plaintiff left defendant's hotel.
The New York courts which have considered this problem of the hotel's liability for
property which it keeps after the guest has left have followed the general rule and
have likewise held that with the departure of the guest and the termination of the
guest-innkeeper relationship the hotel was not thereafter an insurer but a bailee.0
It is clear that the purpose in enacting the statute in question was to limit the
liability of the innkeeper as an insurer.'0 The instant decision would extend the
benefit of the statute to the hotel without extending the liability which the statute
was enacted to limit. Had the legislature intended the statute to apply after the
guest-innkeeper relationship had ceased and the innkeeper was no longer an insurer
with respect to the belongings of the guest, it would probably have made a clear
expression to that effect. It is doubtful that the decision under review reflects the
legislative intent.
PARTNERSHIP--CoNTNUATION OF BusINESS BY SURVIVING PARTNERS AFTER DEATH
OF A PARTNER-RIGHT OF DECEDENT's REPRESENTATIVE To SHARE IN PROFrs.!-
Plaintiff, executrix of the estate of her deceased husband, brought this action against
surviving partners of a firm in which decedent had been a partner for dissolution of
the partnership, an accounting and appointment of a receiver. Upon decedent's
death in 1949 the surviving partners.failed to liquidate the partnership business and
pay plaintiff her husband's interest in the firm. In her action plaintiff sought to
recover the profits earned after the dissolution of the firm which might be attributable
to the use of her husband's capital by the defendants in continuing the partnership
business after his death. The trial court denied plaintiff a recovery of a share of
the profits and the Appellate Division affirmed. On appeal, two justices dissenting,
held, judgment affimed. The option to recover the profits accrues only where the
business is continued after the death of a partner with the consent of the repre-
sentative of the deceased partner. Blur v. Katz et al., 13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953).
7. 103 Ohio 638, 134 N.E. 460, 461 (1921).
8. 103 Ohio 638, 134 N.E. 460, 462 (1921).
9. Crosby v. Fifth Avenue Hotel, 173 Misc. 595, 20 N.Y.S.2d 277 (App. Term 1939);
Hoffman v. Roessle, 39 Misc. 787, 81 N.Y. Supp. 291 (App. Term 1902).
10. Wilkens v. Earle, 44 N.Y. 172 (1870). The Court of Appeals held that the present
statute preserves the liability of the innkeeper but limits the amount of recovery; Pervis v.
Coleman and Stetson, 21 N.Y. 111 (1860); Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N.Y. 258 (1869).
1954]
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This case involves the interpretation of two sections of the Uniform Partnership
Act' adopted by New Jersey 2 upon which plaintiff bases her demand for a share of
the profits attributable to the use of her husband's capital since his death. It appears
that the sections under consideration are a reiteration of the common law principles
prevailing prior to the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act. In Fleming v.
Fleming et al.,3 the court held that the surviving partners had the right to wind up
the firm business and make settlement with the administrator and plaintiff, deceased
partner's widow, but not having done so and having elected to continue the business,
must account to the plaintiff for profits realized from the continued use of the
decedent's property in the partnership business.
The status, duties, and obligations of partners as to each other are regulated by
the express contract between them as far as the express contract extends, 4 but those
duties and obligations which are not reached by the express contract are implied
by law.5 The relationship of partnership is fiduciary in character and imposes on
1. Uniform Partnership Act § 41(3). "When any partner retires or dies and the business
of the dissolved partnership is continued .. .with the consent of the retired partners or
the representative of the deceased partner, but without any assignment of his right In
partnership property, rights of creditors of the dissolved partnership and of the creditors
of the person or partnership continuing the business shall be as if such assignment had
been made."
§ 42 "When any partner retires or dies, and the business is continued ...without any
settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership continu-
ing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representative as against such
persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his
interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or at his option or at the option of his
legal representative, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right In
the property of the dissolved partnership; .... "
2. N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 42 §§ 41(3), 42 (1940).
3. 211 Iowa 1251, 230 N.W. 359 (1930). See also Cahill v. Haff, 248 N.Y. 377, 380, 162
N.E. 288, 289 (1928) where the court said that Section 42 is "merely a statement of the
pre-existing law."
4. Levy v. Leavitt, 257 N.Y. 461, 178 N.E. 758 (1931).
5. Young et al. v. Cooper, 30 Tenn. App. 55, 203 S.W.2d 376 (1947).
6. Uniform Partnership Act § 21. "Every partner must account to the partnership for
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent
of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property."; Sonek et al. v.
Hill Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 138 NJ. Eq. 534, 49 A.2d 303 (1946); Fouchek et al. v. Jantcek,
190 Ore. 251, 225 P.2d 783 (1950). See Meinhard v. Salmon et al., 249 N.Y. 458, 463-464,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) where Judge Cardozo said: ". . . copartners, owe to one another,
... the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissable in a workaday world
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. . . . Only thus
has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd."
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the members of the firm the obligation of the utmost good faith and loyalty in their
dealings with one another with respect to partnership affairs. This fiduciary relation-
ship continues after the dissolution of the partnership so as to impose upon the
surviving partners the same duty of fair dealing with respect to the retired partner
or the representative of a deceased partner.7
The general rule is that after a partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner
the surviving partner has no authority to continue the partnership business as a
going concern,8 but rather has the right and duty to liquidate the affairs of the firm.°
Except as incidental to the winding up of the partnership business,10 the surviving
partner may not enter into new obligations. 1 If the survivors of the partnership
carry on the business as a going concern and enter into new transactions with the
partnership funds, the representative of a deceased partner may elect to call on them
for the return of the deceased partner's interest in the firm, either with a share of
the profits or with interest at the legal rate.' - The personal representative, there-
fore, is in the advantageous position of demanding at least the legal rate of interest
on the deceased partner's capital or a share of the profits attributable to the use of
that capital, if the share of the profits exceed the interest thereon.
There is no dissension on this principle, but the majority of the New Jersey court
concludes that this principle applies only where the representative has given consent
to the continued operation of the business; that the statutory plan requiring consent
consistently provides that the quid pro quo for the right to a proportionate share
of the profits of the new business, if the personal representative so chooses, is the
assumption of the additional risk of claims of new creditors. Without the personal
representative's consent, the majority reasons, no additional risk is assumed and
the legislature by its enactment gave no right to a share of the profits. Furthermore,
the majority of the court would reach the same result without recourse to the statute,
upon consideration of merely the broad equitable doctrines applicable. In support
of this latter proposition the majority cites the case of Lattera et al. v. Lattcra'3
in which the complainant entered into a partnership with the defendant to engage
in the operation of a poultry farm. Plaintiff's contribution to the business consisted
of chickens and poultry houses and her services as well and she assisted in the work
connected with the business and received profits therefrom until 1936 when defendant
denied her further payments. From that date she was otherwise employed and
rendered no further services to the business. The court denied her claim for a share
of the profits in the enterprise holding that such right rested upon a contribution of
skill, time and diligence, rather than the mere use of capital. In the light of this
decision, the majority in the case under consideration decided that the success of
7. Richter et al. v. Richter et al., 202 Ga. 554, 43 S.E.2d 635 (1947); Collier v. Benjes,
195 M~d. 168, 73 A.2d 21 (1950).
8. Uniform Partnership Act § 33. "Except so far as may be necessary to wind up
partnership affairs or to complete transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution
terminates all authority of any partner to act for the partnership .... .1
9. In re Vitelli's Estate, 196 Misc. 644, 92 N.Y.S.d 322 (Surr. CL 1949).
10. Rosenthal et al. v. Hasberg, 84 N.Y. Supp. 290 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
11. Durant v. Pierson et al., 124 N.Y. 444, 26 N.. 1095 (1891).
12. Vanderplow v. Fredericks et al, 321 Mich. 4S3, 32 N.W.2d 718 (1948); .Drapkin
et al v. Klebanoff, 5 N.J. Misc. 531, 137 At. 432 (Ch. 1927); Froess v. Froess, 289 Pa.
69, 137 AtL 124 (1927); Underdown v. Underdown, 279 Pa. 482, 124 At. 159 (1924);
Mattson et al. v. Wagstad, 188 Wis. 566, 206 N.W. 865 (1926).
13. 134 N.J. Eq. 162, 34 A.2d 289 (1943).
1954]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the business was due to the personal element and efforts of the partners and that
under the circumstances and proof, it would be inequitable to permit the plaintiff to
participate in the profits made after the dissolution to which she contributed nothing.
There is authority contrary to the position asserted by the majority. In Zach
et al. v. Schulman,14 the court held that the sections under consideration give the
surviving partners no additional rights, but rather relate wholly to the rights of a
retired partner or the representative of a deceased partner and that the sole purpose
of the statutory reference to consent is to protect the rights of creditors; if no
consent is given, the surviving partners are not to be protected. Another contrary
decision is M. & C. Creditor's Corp. v. Pratt et al.15 There, a New York court in
construing the identical sections of the Uniform Act held that the requirement of
consent by the decedent's representative to a continuance of the business was a
prerequisite to subjecting the decedent's interest to creditors of the continuing
business and could not have been intended to limit the rights of the representatives to
require payment of the decedent's interest as of the day of death. Although these
decisions are contrary to the contention of the majority in the instant case, the courts
in these cases have not set forth a basis or foundation for their interpretation of
Sections 41 and 42 of the Uniform Partnership Act.
The principle of law which should govern in these cases is the fiduciary relation-
ship that exists between partners. 16 The opinion of the court in In re Eisenlohr's
Estate17 best points out the existence of this fiduciary relationship: "The general
rule is firmly established that one who, while acting in a fiduciary capacity, mixes
with his own money the funds under his control is liable either for interest thereon
or a share of the profits in lieu of interest, at the option of the cestui que trust....
This rule, as applied to partnership- transactions, requires the surviving partner to
account to the estate of the deceased partner for profits incident to the completion
of existing contracts and the settling of the firm business, so long as the capital
of deceased remains therein; and, if the survivor carries on the business for a longer
time than necessary, for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the firm, he may be
compelled to account to the estate of the deceased partner for the share of the
profits or to pay interest on the capital used." It is clearly evident that it would be
inequitable to allow the surviving partners to commingle the funds or interest of
the deceased partner with their own and to reap the entire benefit of any profits they
may make therefrom. The soundness of this proposition is alluded to in the dissent-
ing opinion in the present case where it is contended that the principle of unjust
enrichment would be violated in allowing the surviving partners to profit from
the unauthorized use of decedent's interest in the firm. The holding of the majority
that a right to share in profits does not rest upon the mere use of capital has no
merit. In giving the legal representative of the deceased partner the right to take
profits Section 42 of the Uniform Partnership Act expressly provides that such right
exists where the realization of profits was to some extent "attributable to the use of
decedent's right in the property of the dissolved partnership."18
14. 213 Ark. 122, 210 S.W.2d 124 (1948).
15. 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 838, 7 N.Y.S.2d
662, app. denied, 255 App. Div. 962, 8 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 804,
24 N.E.2d 482 (1939).
16. See note 6 supra.
17. 258 Pa. 431, 435, 102 At. 115, 116 (1917). Accord, Freeman v. Freeman, 142 Mass.
98, 7 N.E. 710 (1886); Germann v. Jones, 220 App. Div. 5, 221 N.Y. Supp. 32 (4th
Dep't 1927).
18. The basis upon which a partner or his legal representative is held entitled to an
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It is submitted that the New Jersey court has taken a superficial view of the sections
under consideration and has attributed a literal interpretation thereto where none
could have been intended by the legislature.19
TAxATiON-INcomm TAx-TAxABm.y OP o RCEIPTS PREVIOUSLY AssroGED.-The
taxpayer entered into an agreement with one Moon, the purchasing agent of one of the
taxpayer's best customers, whereby the taxpayer was to have certain plating work
done by a third company and billed to Moon's employer. The taxpayer planned to
charge the same amount he was charged by the third company but Moon arranged
that the taxpayer would charge an additional dollar per unit to be turned over to
Moon without his employer's knowledge. As a result $6110.00 in cash was turned
over to Moon without receipts issued therefor. A second agreement was entered into
whereby the taxpayer was to have cylindrical tanks manufactured for Moon's
employer at cost plus two dollars per unit to be given to Moon as commission.
From this Moon received $542.00. The payments were not recorded in the company
books until an investigation was in progress by an internal revenue agent. The
Commissioner contended that the funds received by the taxpayer's company should
have been reported as income under § 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, and
that they were not deductible as expenses under § 23(a)(1)(A). The Tax Court
sustained the contention of the Commissioner, and referred to the payments in the
nature of bribes or graft. On appeal, held, judgment reversed. The amounts in
question were not income to the taxpayer, since they were not received by taxpayer
under a claim of right. Estate of Lashells v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 430 (6th
Cir. 1953).
The court based its decision upon its interpretation of the claim of right doctrine,
developed by the Supreme Court in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet.'
In that case the title to property was in dispute as between the taxpayer and the
Government. A lower court gave judgment for the taxpayer and the Government
appealed. The Supreme Court held that the income received by the taxpayer pending
the appeal by the Government was income to the taxpayer, even though the appeal
was not decided in favor of the taxpayer until five years after the income was
received. The Court stated that "If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of
accounting for profits earned after the dissolution is the use to which his interest in the
capital of the firm has been put in earning such profits. If the firm had no capital at
all outside of the services and personal qualifications of its members, a partner, not
contributing any services to the business of the firm after the dissolution, would not be
entitled to any share of the subsequently earned profits.
19. It is also submitted that the New Jersey court has committed error in its decision
on the counterclaim of the surviving partners that they were entitled to be reimbursed for
sums paid to other employees required to perform the deceased partner's work. The
court in denying defendant's counterclaim embraced the doctrine of waiver, finding that
these expenditures were not charged against the deceased partner's account while he was
alive. The necessary conclusion that the court would allow compensation if it had found
no waiver controverts the rule of Section 18(f) of the Uniform Partnership Act. This statute
specifically provides: "No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partner-
ship business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for
his services in winding up the partnership affairs."
1. 286 US. 417 (1932).
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right and without restrictions as to its disposition, he has received taxable income
. . . even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money,
and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore it equivalent."'2 The
doctrine was again applied in United States v. Lewis.8
The court in the instant case also relies upon Commissioner v. Wilcox4 where
the Supreme Court held that embezzled funds did not constitute taxable income to
the embezzler because the embezzler was required by law to return the money to
his employer.
Quite apart from the fact that the Wilcox case was for all practical purposes
overruled by being limited to its facts in Rutkin v. United States, the court, in
finding no claim of right because the taxpayer was under an agreement to pass the
money over to Moon, seems to miss the point that the Supreme Court in the cases
decided by it consistently refers the claim of right doctrine to the relationship
between the taxpayer and the person from whom he receives the money and to the
possible obligation to return or restore the money.0 At no time has that Court applied
the doctrine to a situation where the receipt of taxable income would be affected by
an obligation of the taxpayer who earns the money to pass it on to a third party.
The effect of such obligations has, however, been considered by the Supreme Court.
In Lucas v. Earl,1 a valid contract, executed prior to the passage of the income tax
laws, to have all income received by either a husband or wife treated as income
received as joint tenants was not permitted to prevent the income earned solely
by the husband from being taxed to him alone. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for
the court said: "There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who
earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrange-
ments and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid
from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the
import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken
according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed
to a different tree from that on which they grew.' 8 These principles were followed
in Helvering v. Horst,9 where payments on negotiable interest coupons given to
2. Id. at 424.
3. 340 U.S. 590 (1951). Here the taxpayer mistakenly received, claimed and used a
sum in excess of a bonus to which he was entitled. The Court stated that the claim of
right doctrine is "now deeply rooted in the federal tax system."
4. 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946). ".. . a taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence
of a claim of right to the alleged gain and (2) absence of a definite, unconditional obliga-
tion to repay or return that which would otherwise constitute a gain. Without some
bonafide legal or equitable claim, even though it be contingent or contested in nature,
the taxpayer cannot be said to have received any gain or profit within the reach of § 22(a)."
5. 343 U.S. 130 (1952). There it was held that a taxpayer who has extorted money
has received taxable income when as a practical matter he has such control o, er it that
he derived realizable economic value from it and ". . . that occurs when cash, as here, Is
delivered by its owner to the taxpayer in a manner which allows the recipient freedom
to dispose of it at will, even though it may have been obtained by fraud and his freedom
to use it may be assailable by someone with better title to it." Id. at 137.
6. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590
(1951); North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
7. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
8. Id. at 114-115.
9. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
[Vol. 23
RECENT DECISIONS
the taxpayer's son shortly before their maturity and cashed within the year received
were held to be taxable income to the donor. Likewise in Harrison v. Schaffner,10
where the taxpayer, beneficiary of a trust, assigned to some of her children portions
of the trust income for the year following the assignment, the income remained
taxable to her. As Mr. Justice Holmes in Corliss v. Bower," has stated it, "The
income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that is free to enjoy
at his own option may be taxed to him as his income whether he sees fit to enjoy
it or not." In the instant case the taxpayer was the source of the money turned
over to Moon as commissions. They were subject to his command since they
were unconditionally paid to him, and their taxability should remain unaffected by
any arrangement to pass them on to a third party.
The court in the present case referred to instances where receipts, such as funds
received to be turned over to a state association,' 2 rent received by an agent 1a fees
collected by an attorney,1 4 commissions collected by an agent,15 or payments to
utilities where the funds are distributed to customers,1' do not constitute taxable
income. These cases are not relevant. The money paid to the taxpayer was paid by
one of his debtors for services rendered, and upon the basis of a submitted bill.
The taxpayer was not an agent. He was the "tree on which the fruits grew" and as
such derived taxable income.' 7
The court found it unnecessary to consider the problem of the deduction of the
commissions. Only the ordinary and necessary expenses of a business may be
deducted.' 8 Thus the deduction of "graft '19 or payments to obtain influence2 6 has
been disallowed. It would seem, therefore, that the taxpayer in the present case
should also be prohibited from claiming these payments as deductible expenses.2
TORTS-PE-NATAL INJURIES-RECVERY FOR THOSE INPLICTED PRIoR To
VIBrLrry.-Plaintiff brought an action to recover for injuries allegedly the result
of the defendant's negligence in operating an automobile which struck plaintiff's
mother while she was in the third month of pregnancy. The defendant moved for a
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, which motion was
denied. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division, Third Department, held, affirmed.
If a child born after an injury sustained during any period of pre-natal life can
10. 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
11. 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930). See also National Carbide Corp. v. Commk-oner, 336
U.S. 422 (1949); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. $91 (1948).
12. Horace Mill, 5 T.C. 691 (1945).
13. Richard T. Gillespie, 2 B.TA. 1317 (1925).
14. Mark D. Eagleton, 35 B.T.A. 551 (1937).
15. James S. Mluir, 3 B.T.A. 165 (1925).
16. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Power Commisson et al., 134 F.2d 263 (7th
Cir. 1942).
17. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
18. Int. Rev. Code § 23(a) (1) (A). But see Lilly et al. v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. g0
(1952), where the court allowed the deduction of kickbacks from optical companies to
doctors who referred patients to the companies. Such payments were accepted business
practice which did not violate any dearly defined public policies.
19. Kelley-Dempsey & Co., 31 B.T.A. 351 (1934).
20. Rugel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 127 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942).
21. This was the view of the Tax Court. Estate of Lashells, 11 T.C.M. 274 (193).
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prove the effect on him of the tort, he makes out a right to recover. Kelly v. Gregory
282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't. 1953).
Generally the law has looked upon an unborn child as in esse for all purposes
beneficial to the child. In property law posthumous children are regarded as in
existence from the moment of conception' and in criminal law one who feloniously
inflicts injuries upon an unborn child which is born alive but subsequently dies from
the injuries is chargeable with homicide as in the case of the killing of any other
human being.2 Until recently most jurisdictions refused to carry this approach over
into the field of tort liability on the ground that it was merely a legal fiction owing
its origin to the civil law.3 The two main reasons for denying a recovery in these
cases are that a defendant owes no duty of conduct to a person who is not in existence
and secondly that the difficulty of proving any causal connection between negligence
and damages is too great.4 New York adopted this view when the Court of Appeals
decided the leading case of Drobner v. Peters.5 However, since the Drobner case
was decided in 1921, numerous and impressive precedents have been developed allow-
ing a recovery where the infant was viable0 at the time of the injury.7 This theory
stems from Judge Boggs' often cited dissent in Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital et al.,8 to
the effect that the fact that an infant can survive when removed from his mother's
womb shows that he has a separate existence at that point. New York reached the
same result in 1951 when Woods v. LancetP was decided. The Court of Appeals
carefully pointed out, however, that the holding was strictly confined to infants who
1. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 83 sub. 12. See In re Wells' Will, 129 Misc. 447, 451,
221 N.Y. Supp. 714, 719 (Surr. Ct. 1927) and 21 Harv. L. Rev. 360 (1907) for common
law citations on this point.
2. Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898); Blackstone's Commentaries Book
1, c. 1 pp. 129, 130 (1765); N.Y. Penal Law § 1050.
3. Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. et al., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926);
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital et al., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900); Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Newman v. City of Detroit 281 Mich.
60, 274 N.W. 710 (1939); Stemmer et al. v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942);
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169,
49 Ad. 704, 705 (1901); See also the opinion of Johnson J. in the leading Irish case of
Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co. of Ireland, 28 L.R. Ir. 69, 84 (1891), which influenced
many of the above decisions.
4. Prosser on Torts 189 (1941).
5. 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
6. "Capable of living, denoting a fetus sufficiently developed to live outside of the
womb, i.e., a fetus of seven months or older." Stedman, Medical Dictionary 1495 (18th cd.
1953).
7. Bonbrest et al. v. Kotz et al., 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPhecters, 33
Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Il1. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412
(1953); Verkennes v. Corneia et al., 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); William v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Jasinsky v. Potts,
153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950). Despite the trend established by these recent
decisions the older rule is not dead. See Bliss v. Passandsi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206
(1950), reaffirming Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
8. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 641 (1900). The majority view on this case was recently
overruled in Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
9. 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951). "Therefore, we confine our holding
in this case to prepartum injuries to such viable children."
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were viable at the time of the injury. The instant case goes a step further and urges
that the same rule should govern whether or not the infant is viable at the time of
the injury.
The result reached is not without support, for it has frequently been urged that
a child is in being from the moment of its conception and therefore it should be able
to recover for injuries to it during any stage of foetal development.' 0 But there
is very little judicial basis for this position, for, as was previously pointed out, most
of the cases permitting a recovery were limited to infants viable at the time of the
injury. The instant case cites Montreal Tramways v. Leveilles t as precedent for
affirming an award based on the general pre-natal rights of an injured person and
not upon viability. The authority of the case is weakened by the fact that the
decision is based upon statute' 2 and the fact that the plaintiff was actually viable at
the time of the injury. Two American decisions use language which lends support
to the result in the instant case. In Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc.,'3 it was held
that an infant can recover for pre-natal injuries without applying the viability test.
But as a matter of fact the plaintiff was viable at the time of the injury, since it
occurred while his mother was being taken to the hospital for delivery. Damasiewicz
et al. v. Gorsuch et aL 4 held that an infant could recover for injuries while cn vcnitre
sa mere but the opinion fails to state the age of the plaintiff at the time of the tort.
A concurring opinion would limit recovery to situations where the embryo has
become viable.
The principal reason behind the court's departure from precedent in the instant
case was its view that legal separability begins at the moment of conception.'s It is
submitted, however, that the dispute as to when legal separability commences is
nothing more than academic quibbling. While we are in accord with the result in
the instant case, it would be more realistic to base recovery on the fact that an infant
en ventre sa mere has the potentiality of becoming a normal healthy human being
and is owed a duty of reasonable care in order that it might secure the actualization
of that potency.
The only sound objection to permitting a recovery in cases of this type is the
problem of distinguishing valid claims from the fictitious ones. The enforcement of
strict requirements of competent medical evidence would seem to be a sufficient
safeguard in the light of the progress which has been made in the field of human
embryology 1 6
10. See 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1949); 34 Ilinn. L. Rev. 65 (1949); 35 Comell L.Q.
648 (1950).
11. [1933] 4 DL.R. 337 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
12. Civil Code of Quebec Art. 345.
13. 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951).
14. 197 Did. 417, 79 A-2d 550 (1951).
15. Patten, Human Embryology 181 (2d ed. 1953).
16. Verkennes v. Comeia et al, 229 ]&ira. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949), was noted in
19 Ford. L. Rev. 108. In the discussion of that case it was contended that the viability
distinction was logical because prior to viability the foetus has no separate existence from
its mother. In view of the medical authorities noted in the present discussion that position
seems no longer tenable.
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WILLS-CHARITIES-VALIDITY OF A BEQUEST TO A LABOR UNION FUND AS A
CHARITABLE TRUST.-The executor of a decedent's estate requested a judicial
construction of paragraphs of testator's will granting a bequest to the unemployment
fund of a labor union. The bequest was of a residue of the estate to the executor
and trustee in trust with direction to turn it over to the "Unemployment Fund of
Local 119, Paper Cutters Union." This fund was created by the union and ad-
ministered according to provisions set out in the union's by-laws. The source of the
fund was regular assessments upon union members and the proceeds of an annual
ball. The fund was to be distributed to qualifying members of the union during
periods of unemployment and to members attaining the age of sixty-five years and
unable to continue in their trade. However, there was no limitation in the union's
constitution or by-laws restricting the use of the fund to the relief of unemployment.
Neither the fund nor the union itself were incorporated. The Surrogate's Court
adjudged the bequest to be a valid charitable trust. On appeal, held, one justice
dissenting, judgment affirmed. The bequest was valid as a gift to charitable or
benevolent purposes as enunciated by Section 12 of the Personal Property Law. In re
Pattberg's Will, 282 App. Div. 770, 123 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1953).
Bequests to unincorporated associations have generally been held to be void.'
However, in New York it is established by statute that such a gift can be saved where
circumstances clearly indicate by express words or by necessary implication a purpose
and intent to devote the gift to a religious, benevolent, educational, or charitable
purpose.2 The majority reasoned that the bequest, though limited to a class, was
one which included purposes of such public usefulness as to insure its charitable
character.
In determining what constitutes a charitable trust many definitions8 have been
offered and various lists of charitable purposes have been compiled. 4 The definitions
are very general and the listings are not all inclusive. Therefore, a consideration
and analysis of specific cases is necessary to determine the existence of a charitable
purpose.
In T. J. Moss Tie Co.5 the United States Tax Court decided that an employees'
benefit trust, which was established for the purpose of extending financial aid to
1. Ely v. Megie, 219 N.Y. 112, 113 N.E. 800 (1916); Fralick v. Lyford et al., 107
App. Div. 543, 95 N.Y. Supp. 433 (3d Dep't 1907).
2. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12; In re Andrejevick's Estate, 57 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Surr.
Ct. 1945).
3. Representative of the definitions is that contained in a California case: "A 'charitable
trust' is defined to he a gift for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their hearts and minds under the influence of education or religion, by relieving
their bodies of disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting to establish themselves for life,
by erecting or maintaining public buildings, or in other ways lessening the burden or making
better the condition of the general public, . . . indefinite as to names and numbers. In
short, it is a gift to a general public use." In re Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal. 327, 92 Pac.
870 (1907). See also the definition in the Restatement of Trusts § 368.
4. Most noteworthy of the lists because they are the guide for numerous holdings are
the enumeration in the Preamble of the Statute of Charitable Uses (Statute of Elizabeth,
43 Eliz. c. 4. (1601) ) and the listing of charitable organizations in § 101 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Concerning the former enumeration it is to be noted that the only religious
purpose listed is the repair of religious edifices, while under the modern view all religious
purposes are included.
5. 18 T.C. 188 (1952).
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needy employees, was charitable. This holding was extended in another casec to
include also as charitable a bequest to the pension fund of a corporation. Further
substantiation of the two previous holdings is found in In Estate of CarlsonT where
a bequest to provide retirement benefits was held to be charitable. Apparently then,
the holding of the instant case seems not to be without precedent,8 but it is submitted
that there is another type of case under which the instant case, because of its own
peculiar fact situation, more appropriately fits, i.e., cases involving mutual benefit
associations.9 Primarily it is argued that the disbursement of benefits by mutual
benefit associations is not a charitable purpose and, secondarily, that the members
may have an enforceable contract right.10 The dissent, in reasoning that the purpose
in question was not a charitable one, seems to treat the fund as akin to that of a
mutual benefit association. In addition the dissenting opinion points out that there
is no restriction upon the use of the so-called "unemployment fund."
Charitable trusts are enforced generally because they are thought to be for the
good of the community, i.e., the benefit extends to a sufficiently large class of
society.11 Such a purpose has been termed a public charity.' But an association
supported by contributions or assessments from members who thereby become
eligible for certain discretionary benefits does not appear to be a public charity, and
it has been held that the use of funds for members only precludes any idea of
charity.-3 Consequently, payments for the benefit of members rather than the
6. In re Tarrant's Estate, 38 Cal.2d 42, 237 P.2d 505 (1951).
7. 21 T.C. (No. 34) - (1953).
8. Also see In re Casper's Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Surr. Ct. 1947) and In re Fox's
Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Surr. Ct. 1946) cited by the majority. The court in the former
case relies merely on the latter decision and that decision in turn merely found that under
the law of Indiana the union as legatee was capable of taking and holding bequests of
personal property.
9. Mutual benefit associations organized by employees with a fund for welfare benefits
are to be distinguished from welfare funds which are established with joint employer and
union management pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of
employees. This latter type may involve a variety of legal problems in view of applicable
Taft-Hartley Law provisions and recent legal developments. See Illegal Pension and
Welfare Funds, 4 Labor LJ. 13 (1953); Health and Welfare Trust, 5 Labor L.J. 29 (1954).
10. 2A Bogert, Trust and Trustees § 367 (1935).
11. Scott, Charitable Trusts in New York, 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 251 (1951).
12. It is to be noted there is authority which considers the use of the phrase "public
charity" confusing for the purposes of the law of charitable trusts. See 2A Bogert, Trust
and Trustees § 262 (1935). However, it is submitted that the use is valid here in that
"charitable" and "public" are not in this instance synonymous as some would contend.
13. County Assessor v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
Local 329, 202 OkL 162, 211 P.2d 790 (1948). In re Dol's Estate, 182 Cal. 159, 187 Pac.
428 (1920). Contra: Butterworth et al. v. Keeler et al., 219 N.Y. 446, 114 N.E. 803 (1916)
cited by the majority. Also cited is Matter of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 117
(1916) but it is submitted that the court's own words render that case distinguishable
since it said, "If the purpose of the testatrix had been to create a trust only for the benefit
of her own relatives and certain designated friends . . ., the trust would not come within
the designation of a charitable trust . . ., but if the purpose of the trust was public the
mere fact that the testatrix intended to give a preference ... does not ... make it invalid
or preclude it from possessing the character of a charitable trust." Thus it seems the
benevolence is not completely restricted. See also In re Kruger's Estate, 264 Pa. 51, 107 At.
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public make the mutual benefit society an insurance group.14 And where the benefits
are restricted to members in good standing, as is the usual practice, the concept of
charity is excluded and at times it has been said that the members have an enforceable
right to those benefits.15 There is nothing in present case showing that charity or
benevolence would be extended to non-members and the record is devoid of any
limitation on the use of the fund restricting it to charitable purposes. Similar
bequests have been held invalid.16 The fund in the instant case then is the property
of the union for its own purposes which most certainly are not all charitable. The
unrestricted bequest then may be used for purposes which are not charitable in
nature; and it has been clearly established that where charitable and non-charitable
purposes are mingled or the terms of the bequest are so broad as to include non-
charitable purposes the entire gift fails for uncertainty. 17
There is also the following line of authority which renders the decision in the instant
case at least questionable. In an English case' s the testator left a bequest to the
Boiler Makers Benevolent Fund, a fund administered by the trade union, the Boiler
Makers Society, in accordance with its by-laws. It was held there that this was not
a charitable gift but was in effect a gift to the society for the purposes of the society,
which purposes were solely for the membership's benefit. Similarly in Swift's
Executor v. Beneficial Society of Borough of Easton'0 where the testatrix left a
bequest to a beneficial society whose object was relief of sick members only, the
use was held non-charitable. Thus a common fund created by voluntary contribu-
tions, the benefits being restricted to members of the association, has not ordinarily
been considered a charitable fund.2 0 This tenet has some support in New York.
For example in In re Kennedy's Estate2 ' where a bequest to an alumnae society
fund to maintain a welfare fund and pensions for members was held not to be a
charitable gift, the court pointed out that trade unions and mutual benefit societies
are held non-charitable entities by the weight of authority.
In view of the number of factors involved and the variety of fact situations in
which they can arise, no complete set of rules can be established to apply in each
case, but it is suggested that the court in the instant case did not fully consider
all the factors and gave an extended liberal interpretation of "charitable trust" which
in the opinion of many is already too liberally construed.
379 (1919) where an association was held to be a public charity because benevolence was
extended to non-members also.
14. Zollman on Charities § 206, p. 143 (1924); State v. Brawner, 15 Mo. App. 597
(1884).
15. County Assessor v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
Local 329, 202 Old. 162, 211 P.2d 790 (1948) ; also see note 14 supra.
16. Tulsa County et al. v. St. John's Hospital, 200 Old. 176, 191 P.2d 983 (1948) where
evidence is lacking that benevolence will be extended to non-members; Matter of Stephanl
Estate, 164 Misc. 240, 300 N.Y. Supp. 813 (Surr. Ct. 1937) where no limitation on the
use of funds appears; Morgan v. National Trust Bank of Charleston et al., 331 111. 182,
162 N.E. 888 (1928).
17. In re Durbrow's Estate, 245 N.Y. 469, 157 N.E. 747 (1927).
18. In re Amos, [18911 3 Ch. 159.
19. 73 Pa. St. 362 (1873).
20. Burke v. Roper, 79 Ala. 138 (1885); In re Hobourn Aero Components Ltd., Air
Raid Distress Fund, [19461 1 Ch. 194, noted in 201 L.T. 41 (1946).
21. 240 App. Div. 20, 269 N.Y. Supp. 136 (1st Dep't 1934).
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